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STATE V. YANCEY: DENIAL OF A DEFENDANT’S REQUEST 
TO BE PRESENT DURING A VOIR DIRE BENCH 
CONFERENCE WITH A JUROR WHO IS LATER SELECTED 
TO SERVE IS NOT HARMLESS ERROR. 
 
By: Shannon A. Stern 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the denial of a defendant’s 
request to be present at voir dire bench conferences is not harmless error when 
a prospective juror disclosed information of potential bias and was selected to 
sit on the jury without input from the defendant.  State v. Yancey, 442 Md. 616, 
617, 113 A.3d 685, 686 (2015).  The court determined that the State did not 
meet its burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id. at 628-31, 113 A.3d at 692-94. 
     Eric Yancey (“Yancey”) was charged with robbery with a dangerous 
weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery, and first-degree assault in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County.  At the beginning of trial, Yancey’s attorney 
asked the judge if Yancey could approach the bench during voir dire bench 
conferences.  The judge deferred to the policy of the sheriff, who stated that 
he had to make some phone calls to determine the protocol.  However, the 
sheriff did not want Yancey to approach the bench at that time because he was 
in leg irons.   
     After a recess, defense counsel raised the issue of whether Yancey could 
attend bench conferences a second time.  The judge again deferred to the 
sheriff, who stated that Yancey could not approach the bench.  However, the 
judge stated that defense counsel could go back to trial table to inform Yancey 
of what was discussed during bench conferences. 
     Voir dire subsequently started over the objection of defense counsel.  Soon 
after, a bench conference occurred without Yancey’s presence.  During this 
conference, prospective Juror 220 disclosed that two of her brothers had been 
charged with drug and sexual assault crimes, but that it would not affect her 
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.  Juror 220 was ultimately seated 
on the jury. After voir dire ended, the sheriff announced that Yancey could 
approach the bench and the judge allowed Yancey’s leg irons to be removed.   
     Yancey was convicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  He 
appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.  The 
court of special appeals reversed, holding that Yancey’s exclusion from the 
bench conference was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which 
was granted.   
     The State conceded that the trial court erred in preventing Yancey from 
attending bench conferences with prospective jurors during voir dire.  Yancey, 
442 Md. at 626, 113 A.3d at 691.  Thus, the only issue before the Court of 
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Appeals of Maryland was whether this error was harmless.  Id. at 626-27, 113 
A.3d at 691.  
     The court of appeals began its determination of whether harmless error 
occurred by looking to precedent for guidance.  Yancey, 442 Md. at 627, 113 
A.3d at 691-92.  In Noble v. State, the court contemplated a situation, in dicta, 
analogous to the facts of Yancey.  Id. at 627, 113 A.3d at 692 (citing Noble v. 
State, 293 Md. 549, 571, 446 A.2d 844, 855 (1982)). There, the court said 
where a defendant is prohibited from attending the voir dire bench conference 
of a juror who is ultimately selected to serve, it would be difficult to find the 
error to be harmless. Id. (citing Noble, 293 Md. at 571, 446 A.2d at 855).  The 
court of appeals then sought to ascertain the proper harmless error standard, 
concluding that an error is harmless if the defendant was not prejudiced 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 627, 113 A.3d at 692 (citing Noble, 293 Md. 
at 568-69, 446 A.2d at 854).   
     The court applied this standard to determine whether harmless error 
occurred. Yancey, 442 Md. at 628, 113 A.3d at 692.  The State argued that the 
burden was on the defendant to prove harmlessness.  Id.  However, the court 
disagreed and determined that the burden was on the State to prove harmless 
error beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
     The court found that the State failed to prove harmless error for three 
reasons.  Yancey, 442 Md. at 627, 113 A.3d at 692.  First, harmless error does 
not occur when a defendant, such as Yancey, is excluded from the entirety of 
bench conferences during voir dire questioning.  Id. at 628-29, 113 A.3d at 
693 (citing United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).  
     Second, the court concluded that it could not be shown that counsel 
conferred with Yancey.  Yancey, 442 Md. at 629, 113 A.3d at 693.  Even if 
counsel did confer with Yancey, the State did not prove that any dialogue 
between counsel and Yancey regarding Juror 220 would cure the error of 
excluding Yancey from the bench conference.  Id. 
     Third, during the bench conference, the juror disclosed that her brothers 
were charged with drug and sexual assault crimes.  Yancey, 442 Md. at 629, 
113 A.3d at 693.  This disclosure was a pivotal question regarding potential 
bias.  Id.  Therefore, the length of the conference is irrelevant.  Id.  Uncovering 
juror bias is one of the underlying reasons why defendants are permitted to be 
present at voir dire bench conferences, no matter how short the conference.  
Id.    
     Therefore, the court concluded that Yancey’s exclusion from the bench 
conference in which Juror 220 disclosed information regarding potential bias 
prejudiced Yancey because the State was unable to prove the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Yancey, 442 Md. at 629, 113 A.3d at 
693.  The court reasoned the State’s assertion that Yancey was not prejudiced 
was purely speculative.  Id. at 630, 113 A.3d at 693.  For example, it is not 
enough for the State to assert that the juror reassured the court that she could 
be fair and impartial.  Id.  Even though Yancey could observe Juror 220 and 
Juror 220 did not show bias at the bench, the observation does not equate to 
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personal presence, and thus does not prove harmless error beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id. at 630, 113 A.3d at 693-94.  
     Moreover, the court ultimately concluded the case hinged on three crucial 
facts.  Yancey, 442 Md. at 630, 113 A.3d at 694.  One, Yancey requested to be 
present at bench conferences during voir dire.  Id.  Two, the presiding judge 
deferred his decision entirely to the sheriff with respect to how to protect 
Yancey’s rights and public safety concerns. Id. Three, the presiding judge 
dismissed defense counsel’s concerns regarding Yancey’s exclusion from 
bench conferences during voir dire.  Id. at 631, 113 A.3d at 694.  Thus, the 
court’s error was not harmless.  Id.  
     In Yancey, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it is not harmless 
error to exclude a defendant from a bench conference during voir dire after the 
defendant asks to be present.  This case is important to Maryland law because 
it reinforces a defendant’s right to be present at every critical stage of trial, 
including bench conferences during voir dire.  The only way that a defendant 
can meaningfully aid his or her attorney in selecting a jury of his or her peers 
is if the defendant receives all information regarding the prospective juror. 
Therefore, attorneys need to make sure that a defendant is advised of his or 
her right to be present at bench conferences during voir dire, regardless of what 
type of crime the defendant is charged with.    
 
